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COMMON LAW PLEADING MODIFIED VERSUS
THE FEDERAL RULES*
MARLYN E. LUGAR* ,
III. Counterclaims
N considering rules of procedure which require two or more
actions where one ought to suffice, perhaps no greater weakness
exists in West Virginia procedure than in the law concerning
counterclaims. In this state the use of counterclaims is governed
by the common law on recoupment, with a statutory modification,
and by the statute permitting set-offs. The application of these
rules has caused much confusion. The great number of cases in
the appellate court involving counterclaims has not only shown the
confusion but also has shown that counsel desire to avoid a multi-
plicity of actions and settle more claims in one action than now
permitted. The writer suggests herein that existing rules unduly
restrict the use of counterclaims but does not recommend at this
time the adoption of rules requiring the use of counterclaims in
any case.
Some of the confusion which has resulted in applying these
rules on counterclaims may have been due to the fact that the
terms "set-off" and "recoupment" have often been used interchange-
ably.1 However, the decisions indicate certain definite rules ap-
plicable to what may be done under each remedy.2
A. Limitations on Permissive Counterclaims in West Virginia
In common law recoupment the defendant cannot recover
* This is the third of a series of articles by the same writer on this subject.
The first concerned the joinder of parties and causes of action [52 W. VA. L.
RFv. 137 (1950)] and the second discussed amendments [53 W. VA. L. R.v. 27
(1950)].
** Associate professor of law, West Virginia University.
1 See, for example, the confusion caused where counsel for the defendant,
at one time in the course of the trial, improperly designated a claim as "recoup-
ment" rather than "set-off". Warren v. Thompson, 111 W. Va. 48, 51, 160 S.E.
297, 299 (1931). Also, in point 1 of the syllabus to Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v.
Breckinridge, 84 W. Va. 233, 99 S.E. 398 (1919), the court used the term "set-
off" when "recoupment" was involved and in the opinion it appears that counsel
filed a "notice of recoupment in damages and set-off." In Charleston Milling &
Produce Co. v. Craighead, 116 W. Va. 194, 179 S.E. 69 (1935), counsel avoided
the problem by filing a "counterclaim", and the court considered the defendant's
rights under both the recoupment and set-off statutes. For a general discussion
of interchangeability of the terms, see Ritz, The Law of Set-Off and Recoup-
ment in West Virginia, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 263 (1930).
2 "The character of the claim is not changed by a name inadvertently given
it." Warren v. Thompson, 111 W. Va. 48, 51, 160 S.E. 297, 299 (1931).
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against the plaintiff for any excess in his damages, 3 but his damages
need not be liquidated.4  However, recoupment is not available
against a plaintiff's demand based on a sealed instrument," nor is it
available unless the damages asserted are for a breach by the plain-
tiff of the contract sued on or a contract made at the same time and
constituting "a part and parcel of the same transaction".
The limitations on the common law remedy have been alle-
viated in two ways in West Virginia. One statute provides that in
a suit for any debt the defendant may have allowed against such
debt any payment or set-off which is so described in his plea, or in
an account filed therewith, as to give the plaintiff notice of its
nature.7  An accompanying statute provides that on the trial of the
issue in such case the jury shall ascertain the amount to which the
defendant is entitled and apply it as a set-off against the plaintiff's
demand, and if such amount be more than the plaintiff is entitled
to, the judgment shall be for the defendant against the plaintiff
for such excess.8 The provisions of this latter statute also apply
to the statutory extension of the defendant's right to recoup, giving
the defendant the right to recover over against the plaintiff. The
recoupment statute will be discussed later.
This statute concerning set-offs allows the defendant to counter-
claim against the plaintiff even though the damages claimed by the
defendant did not arise out of the same contract or transaction.9
However, the use of the term "set-off" in the statute caused the
court to revert to older statutes for its meaning, with the result
that the statute has been confined to liquidated demands. 10 Both
3 Natural Gas Co. v. Healy, 33 W. Va. 102, 10 S.E. 56 (1889); see Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. v. Bitner, 15 W. Va. 455, 465 (1879).
4 See Baltimore & Ohio, R.R. v. Jameson, 13 W. Va. 833, 838 (1878).
S BURKS, PLEADING & PRACTICE § 229 (3d ed., Williams and Burks, 1943).
0 Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Breckinridge, 84 W. Va. 233, 99 S.E. 398 (1919);
Clark's Cove Guano Co. v. Appling, 33 W. Va. 470, 10 S.E. 809 (1890); Logie
v. Black, 24 W. Va. 1 (1884). For a criticism of the way in which the rule
became restricted to contractual claims against the plaintiff, see text at pages
154-156 infra.
7 W. VA. CoDL c. 56, art. 5, § 4 (Michie, 1949).
8 Id. at c. 56, art. 5, § 9.
9 West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Whitmore, 89 W. Va. 622, 109 S.E. 722
(1921). The statute may also be applied to a counterclaim arising out of the
same contract. See Monongahela Tie & Lumber Co. v. Flannigan, 77 W. Va.
162, 166, 87 S.E. 161, 162 (1915).
10 In reaching this conclusion in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Jameson, 13
W. Va. 833 (1878), the court referred to both the English statute of 1729 and
the first set-off statute, which was enacted in Virginia in 1645. A discussion of
these early statutes is also contained in a note in 28 W. VA. L.Q. 139 (1922) and
in 4 MinoR's INSTITUES 786 (3d ed. 1893).
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the plaintiff's claim and the demand proposed to be set-off must be
in the nature of a debt."
The statute provides that a set-off may be used "in a suit for
any debt".12 The form of action need not be debt, but the plaintiff's
claim must be substantially a debt.1" No West Virginia case has
been found in which a set-off was denied because the plaintiff's
claim was not for a debt. However, it has been said that as a rule
the action must be upon some demand which might itself be used
as a set-off.14 The question has often arisen whether the subject of
set-off constituted a liquidated demand and thus was in the nature
of a debt. Courts have not been able to agree on what constitutes
liquidated damages, and the definitions thereof are confusing.Yr
For the purposes of this paper the test applied by the West Virginia
court may be used. The court held in one case that the items set
up must be of that certain character which makes the amount
easily ascertainable by simple calculation and that there was no
uncertainty at all about the items claimed in that case as an offset
because they were of that character which might be recovered in an
action for goods sold and delivered.'" Unliquidated damages for
breach of a contract cannot be set-off.' 7 In such cases neither debt
11 The statute limits the use of set-offs to suits for debts, and by construc-
tion only claims which are in the nature of debts may be set-off. "It must be
a debt against a debt." BuRKs, PLEADING & PRACTICE § 223.
12 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 5, § 4 (Michie, 1949).
13 Charleston Milling & Produce Co. v. Craighead, 116 W. Va. 194, 179 S.E.
69 (1935) (notice of motion for judgment); Beuke v. Boggs Run Mining & Mfg.
Co., 100 W. Va. 141, 130 S.E. 132 (1925) (action of trespass on the case); West
Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Whitmore, 89 W. Va. 622, 109 S.E. 722 (1921)
(action of assumpsit); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Jameson, 13 W. Va. 833 (1878)(action of debt for the recovery of the penalty named in a bond). In the last
case the court said that set-off should be allowed regardless of the form of the
suit or proceeding if it is in substance for the recovery of a debt. Id. at 842.
14 BURKS, PLEADING & PRACTICE § 223. Judge Clark expresses the same idea
in these words: "Set-off was available to the defendant only in actions founded
upon such demands as might have been available as the subject of set-off by
the plaintiff, had the action been brought by the defendant." CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 636 (2d ed. 1947). This type of reasoning was used by the court in
Warren v. Thompson, I11 W. Va. 48, 51, 160 S.E. 297, 298 (1931).
15 BuRKs, PLEADING & PRACTICE § 224. Stated in reverse, it is often difficult
to determine when damages are unliquidated. See Ritz, supra note 1, at 274.
10 West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Whitmore, 89 IV. Va. 622, 109 S.E.
722 (1921). The rule is expressed more generally in Van Raalte Co. v. Solof
Bros. Co., 89 W. Va. 66, 68, 108 S.E. 488, 489 (1921), where the court stated
that the question is whether the claim amounts to a liquidated demand upon
which an action of indebitatus assumpsit will lie. Another general statement
of the rule is that the demand must be certain or capable of being reduced to
certainty by calculation or computation. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Jameson,
13 W. Va. 833, 841 (1878). See also notes 19 and 20 infra.
17 Hooper-Mankin Fuel Co. v. Shrewsbury Coal Co., 94 W. Va. 442, 119 S.E.
176 (1923); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Martin-Nelly Grocery Co., 90 W. Va.
3
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nor general assumpsit would lie, for there is no promise, express or
implied, to pay "a sum certain".' The Virginia court has gone
further in applying an identical statute, the one from which the
West Virginia statute was adopted, and has allowed claims to be set-
off whenever they may be definitely calculated or computed from the
evidence.19 However, it seems that the West Virginia court will con-
tinue to require a promise on the plaintiff's part to pay a sum cer-
tain, though the promise may be express or implied. Where the
promise is express, the terms of the contract rather that the evidence
must furnish the basis for computation of damages. 20 However, if
the plaintiff raises no objection, unliquidated damages may be set-
off.2' In addition, the defendant may waive the damages for breach
730, 111 S.E. 759 (1922); Cook Pottery Co. v. Parker, 86 W. Va. 580, 104 S.E.
51 (1920); Monongahela Tie & Lumber Co. v. Flannigan, 77 W. Va. 162, 87 S.E.
161 (1915); Ashland Coal & Coke Co. v. Hull Coal & Coke Corp., 67 W. Va. 503,
68 S.E. 124 (1910); Case Mfg. Co. v. Sweeny, 47 W. Va. 638, 35 S.E. 853 (1900);
Clark's Cove Guano Co. v. Appling, 33 IV. Va. 470, 10 S.E. 809 (1890).
18 Burics, PLEADING & PRACTICE § 224 n. 13. See also the general statements
of the rule by the West Virginia court set forth in note 16 supra, the specific
application of the rule in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Jameson, 13 W. Va. 833,
843 (1878), being that the claim was one "for which the defendant could have
sued the plaintiff in an action of indebitatus assumpsit, or debt."
1' In New Idea Spreader Co. v. R. M. Rogers & Sons, 122 Va. 54, 94 S.E. 351
(1917), the court held that the defendants could set-off a claim for loss of
profits resulting from the plaintiff's failure to supply items for sale by the
defendants in accordance with the contract between them. The set-off was per-
mitted since the damages could be computed or calculated "from definite
data supplied by the evidence". Id. at 65, 94 S.E. at 354. The same liberality
was shown in Richardson Construction Co. v. Whiting Lumber Co., 116 Va.
490, 82 S.E. 87 (1914), where the court permitted the defendant to set-off the
difference between the contract price and the higher price p~aid in the market
for goods which the plaintiff failed to deliver. The court reached this con-
clusion on the erroneous reasoning that indebitatus assumpsit would lie for this
claim. See BuRs, PLEADING & PRACTIc E § 224 n. 13. The West Virginia court
refused to allow a set-off based on similar facts and criticized the conclusion
reached by the Virginia court. Van Raalte Co. v. Solof Bros. Co., 89 W. Va. 66,
108 S.E. 488 (1921); see Cook Pottery Co. v. Parker, 86 W. Va. 580, 585, 104 S.E.
51, 53 (1920).
20 Hooper-Mankin Fuel Co. v. Shrewsbury Coal Co., 94 W. Va. 442, 119 S.E.
176 (1923); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Martin-Nelly Grocery Co., 90 W. Va.
730, Ill S.E. 759 (1922); Cook Pottery Co. v. Parker, 86 W. Va. 580, 104 S.E. 51
(1920). Where the promise is implied, the amount due may be made sufficiently
certain from the evidence to be allowed as a set-off. Harman v. Harman, 120
W. Va. 199, 196 S.E. 361 (1938) (accrued alimony assigned to the defendant);
Charleston Milling & Produce Co. v. Craighead, 116 W. Va. 194, 179 S.E. 69(1935) (value of goods converted by the plaintiff to his use); Warren v. Thomp-
son, 111 W. Va. 48, 160 S.E. 297 (1931) (reasonable sum for use of a garage);
Beuke v. Boggs Run Mining & Mfg. Co., 100 W. Va. 141, 130 S.E. 132 (1925)
(statutory penalty); West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Whitmore, 89 W. Va.
622, 109 S.E. 722 (1921) (value of material delivered). Compare the certainty
of the amount due needed in the actions of debt and indebitatus assumpsit.
SHIPMAN, COMMON LAw PLEADING §§ 54, 59-61 (3d ed., Ballantine, 1923).
21 Levine Bros. v. Mantell, 90 W. Va. 166, 111 S.E. 501 (1922). Note that
the court views the plaintiff's right to object to set-off of unliquidated damages
4
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of a contract and assert as a set-off the value of material furnished
under the contract.22
To assert an unliquidated claim as a counterclaim the defend-
ant should resort to common law recoupment or the statutory ex-
tension of that right. The limitations on the common law remedy
have been noted.23 The present statute, extending the right, reads
as follows:
"In any action on a contract, the defendant may file a plea
alleging any such failure in the consideration of the contract,
or fraud in its procurement, or any such breach of any war-
ranty to him of the title to real property or of the title or the
soundness of personal property, for the price or value whereof
he entered into the contract, or any other matter, as would
entitle him either to recover damages at law from the plaintiff,
or the person under whom the plaintiff claims, or to relief in
equity, in whole or in part, against the obligation of the con-
tract; or, if the contract be by deed, alleging any such matter
existing before its execution, or any such mistake therein, or
in the execution thereof, or any such other matter, as would
entitle him to such relief in equity; and in either case alleging
the amount to which he is entitled by reason of the matters
contained in the plea. Every such plea shall be verified by
affidavit."2 4
The only changes made in the 1931 revision of this section of
the Code were the insertion of the words "or any other matter" after
the word "contract" near the beginning of the section, and the
addition of the words "or any such other matter" near the end of
the section. 25 Except for these changes the first part of the section
gave the defendant no right of recoupment on unsealed contracts
which he did not have at common law,20 but it did permit him to
recover any excess.2 - However, even before the addition of these
as a "matter of form rather than substance". Id. at 172, 111 S.E. at 503. The
court has also held thlat where a set-off is improperly allowed, even over the
plaintiff's objection, the judgment is merely erroneous and not void. Cross v.
Gall, 65 W. Va. 276, 64 S.E. 533 (1909) (claim not due between the same parties).
22 West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Whitmore, 89 W. Va. 622, 109 S.E.
722 (1921). See also note 20 supra.
23 See text at pages 142-143 supra.
24 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 5, § 5 (Michie, 1949). Italics supplied.
25 See the Revisers' note to this section of the Code.
26 Bumxs, PLEADING & PRAcrIcE 407.
27 By filing a plea under this statute the defendant becomes entitled to
recover any excess under the provisions of W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 5, § 9 (Michie,
1949). No judgment for any excess could be recovered at common law under
a notice of recoupment filed with the general issues of nil debet or non assump.
sit. Monongahela Tie & Lumber Co. v. Flannigan, 77 W. Va. 162, 87 S.E. 161
(1915); see J. C. Orrick & Son Co. v. Dawson, 67 W. Va. 403, 405, 68 S.E. 39, 40
(1910); Natural Gas Co. v. Healy, 33 W. Va. 102, 106, 10 S.E. 56, 58 (1889). To
5
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words the section did extend the right of recoupment to actions on
sealed contracts, 28 which right did not exist at common law,29 and
here also permitted the defendant to recover any excess.30 The
added words now permit the defendant to use in "recoupment" any
matter which would entitle him either to recover damages at law
from the plaintiff, or the person under whom the plaintiff claims,
or which would entitle him to relief in equity, in whole or in part,
against the obligation of the contract whether sealed or unsealed.
3
1
Nevertheless, the basic nature of the statute remains as recoupment,
even though the defendant may recover any excess,32 since the
defendant's plea under the statute is limited to matters growing
out of the contract on which he is being sued.33 The statute enables
the parties to settle in one action all matters between them growing
out of the same transaction surrounding the contract on which the
defendant is being sued, whether such matters are of tort or con-
tract,34 or liquidated or unliquidated, 5 but it goes no further.
Thus, the area within which the defendant may counterclaim
and avoid a second action is very restricted in West Virginia. It is
clear that there can be no set-off in a tort action 6 and that a tort
recover an excess the defendant must file a plea under the statute; notice of
recoupment filed with the general issue will not suffice. See Monongahela Tie
& Lumber Co. v. Flannigan, supra at 168, 87 S.E. at 162. For criticism of a
recent case indicating that matters of recoupment must be alleged by special
plea, see Carlin, Recent Developments in Local Procedure, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 165,
166 (1941).
28 Fisher v. Burdett, 21 W. Va. 626 (1883).
29 BURKS, PLEADING 8& PRACTICE § 229. For any matter of recoupment against
a sealed instrument, the defendant was required at common law to institute a
separate suit against the plaintiff.
30 By filing a plea under this statute the defendant becomes entitled to
recover any excess under the provisions of W. VA. CoDE c. 56, art. 5, § 9 (Michie,
1949).
31 "... the revised section as a whole contemplates the settlement of all
differences that are connected with the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim."
Revisers' note to W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 5, § 5 (Michie, 1949).
32 See note 30 supra.
33 See text at pages 157-160 infra.
34 BURiKs, PLFADING & PRACTICE 406. See also text at pages 157-160 infra.
35 Cook Pottery Co. v. Parker, 86 W. Va. 580, 104 S.E. 51 (1920). See also
text at pages 157-160 infra.
30 Watring v. Gibson, 84 W. Va. 204, 100 S.E. 68 (1919); see Hargreaves v.
Kimberly, 26 W. Va. 787, 800 (1885). In Beuke v. Boggs Run Mining & Mfg.
Co., 100 W. Va. 141, 130 S.E. 132 (1925), in an action of trespass on the case to
recover a statutory penalty, the court permitted the defendant to set-off his
claim for a penalty against the plaintiff under the same statute for mining
coal within five feet of a contiguous boundary. However, in this case the court
did not abandon the rule that there can be no set-off in a tort action. This
was the basis of the decision: "... . This is in fact ...an action for a debt,
whatever the form of action adopted, and though the form may be debt,
assumpsit or case...." Id. at 148, 130 S.E. at 135.
6
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claim cannot be set-off.3 7 In addition, because of the court's view of
liquidated damages as an essential element of a set-off, not even all
contract claims may be set-off; s and even if the claim proposed to
be set-off is liquidated, it may not be used unless the claim asserted
by the plaintiff is also liquidated.39 Where unliquidated claims
would be the basis of counterclaims, whether tort or contract claims,
the defendant may counterclaim as to them only if they arose out
of the same transaction which is the basis of the plaintiff's action
and then only if it is an action on a contract. 40
The injustice to the defendant in refusing him permission to
counterclaim in other cases is illustrated by a West Virginia case 4
in which a nonresident plaintiff sued for the value of goods sold,
and the defendants sought to offset two claims for damages for
alleged breaches of the plaintiff's contracts to sell and deliver to the
defendants certain other goods at prices stipulated in the contracts.
Because of such breaches the defendants had been obliged to pur-
chase in the market those goods at higher prices, whereby they
were damaged to an amount largely in excess of the plaintiff's
demand against them. There was no allegation that these claims
arose out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff sued. The
counterclaims were disallowed since they were unliquidated and
arose out of a different transaction. The defendants were thus
required to defend one action and then to proceed in a separate
action, perhaps outside the state, 42 to recover against the plaintiff
when they allegedly owed him nothing, the reverse being true.
What justification exists for this treatment when the parties were
-7 Fink v. United States Coal & Coke Co., 72 W. Va. 507, 78 S:E. 702 (1913);
Knight v. Brown, 25 W. Va. 808 (1885); see Hargreaves v. Kimberly, 26 W. Va.
787, 800 (1885). In Beuke v. Boggs Run Mining & Mfg. Co., 100 W. Va. 141,
130 S.E. 132 (1925), the court permitted a claim for the penalty under the
statute for mining coal within five feet of a contiguous boundary to be set-off,
but this was treated as an exception to the rule that tort claims may not be
set-off or as not being a tort claim. The court stressed the point that the
defendant's claim was "a demand for a fixed sum-a demand on which, when
the facts on which it rests are ascertbained, the law itself defines the measure of
recovery." Id. at 149, 130 S.E. at 135.
38 See text at pages 143-146 supra.
39 See text at page 144 supra.
40 See text at pages 146-147 supra. As to whether such counterclaims are
permitted only where the action is one on a contract, see also text at pages
154-156 infra.
41 Van Raalte Co. v. Solof Bros. Co., 89 W. Va. 66, 108 S.E. 488 (1921). The
result in this case has been previously criticized. Ritz, supra note 1, at 272;
Note, 28 W. VA. L.Q. 139, 143 (1922).
42 In the plea filed in the case it was alleged that the plaintiff was a non-
resident corporation and that service of process could not be executed upon it
in this state.
7
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identical and all were before the court in the first instance? The
claims would have been allowed as set-offs if they had not been
unliquidated. They would remain unliquidated even if there was
no dispute as to the market value of the goods purchased by the
defendants. 43 Concededly the claims would have been allowed if
they had grown out of the same transaction, and this would be true
even though both the plaintiffs and the defendants' claims were
unliquidated.
Thus, the refusal to permit many counterclaims may have no
justification based on trial convenience, although the principles
applied by the court may have that general purpose. Rules of
pleading designed to prevent issues from becoming complex for
the jury may work in this way an injustice where no confusion is
likely to result. Even if on the facts of the particular case confusion
is likely to result, the trial danger can be eliminated without re-
stricting the pleadings. The device of segregating the issues for
trial has been discussed earlier in this paper.44
Another case which illustrates the hardship which may be im-
posed on the defendant by these restrictive rules as to counterclaims
is J. C. Orrick & Son Co. v. Dawson.4 5 Although commentators
have not criticized this case, as they have the last one, 6 it ought not
to escape attention for it shows a refusal to permit a counterclaim
not because it was not liquidated,, although that was also true, but
because the damages arose from a contract different from the one
on which the plaintiff's action was brought. A nonresident plaintiff
sued to recover a balance on an account for cans and solder sold to
a resident defendant. The defendant attempted to recoup damages
for the alleged failure of the plaintiff to accept canned goods in
payment for the cans and solder as had been agreed. The defend-
ant's testimony was excluded because such an agreement for pay-
ment varied from the written contract for the sale of the canned
goods for cash payment, and apparently the cans and solder had
been purchased at the time of, or prior to, the sale of the canned
goods. Since the parole evidence rule prevented the two agreements
from being "related parts of one contract", the defendant was not
permitted to recoup damages incurred in selling the canned goods
to another at a price lower than agreed. The court conceded that
43 See text at page 145 supra.
44 Lugar, Common Law Pleading Modified Versus the Federal Rules, 52
W. VA. L. REv. 137, 190, 200, 204 (1950).
45 67 W. Va. 403, 68 S.E. 39 (1910).
46 See note 41 supra.
8
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if the cans and solder had been purchased later, the parole evidence
rule would not prevent the admission of the defendant's evidence
and the two agreements might be regarded as one for the purpose
of recoupment. In either case the issues for the jury would have
been the same, and again it becomes apparent that technicalities,
rather than trial convenience, determine when counterclaims may
be asserted in West Virginia.
B. No Compulsory Counterclaims in West Virginia
Having examined the cases in which counterclaims may be
asserted, it remains to be determined whether the defendant is
ever required to assert his counterclaim. At common law the
remedy of recoupment is not compulsory. The defendant is en-
titled to elect whether to set up his damages by way of recoupment
or to bring an independent action.47 He is likely to bring an in-
dependent action if his damages exceeded the plaintiff's demand,
because he can not recover an excess against the plaintiff;48 and if
he asserts his claim, he is precluded from bringing a subsequent
action for the residue of the claim.49 The West Virginia statute
which expands the remedy of recoupment and allows recovery of
any excess does not purport to be compulsory, merely providing
that the defendant "may file a plea". 50 Likewise, the statute allow-
ing set-offs does not purport to be compulsory, providing that the
defendant "may have allowed" a set-off.r' There is nothing to
indicate that the defendant has been deprived of his privilege to
use an independent action to assert any matter which he might use
as a counterclaim. 52
A recent West Virginia case indicates that the statutory expan-
sion of the right to recoup may have deprived the defendant of his
common law right to recoup his damages under the general issue.
In Attorneys' National Clearing House v. Greever,53 the lower court
permitted the defendant to testify, over the plaintiff's objection,
47 See Logie v. Black, 24 W. Va. 1, 19 (1884); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v.
Bitner, 15 W. Va. 455, 465 (1879); Carlin, supra note 27, at 170; Ritz, supra
note 1, at 266.
48 Monongahela Tie & Lumber Co. v. Flannigan, 77 W. Va. 162, 87 S.E.
161 (1915); Natural Gas Co. v. Healy, 33 W. Va. 102, 10 S.E. 56 (1889); see
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Bitner, 15 W. Va. 455, 465, (1879); also articles cited
in note 47 supra.
49 See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Bitner, 15 W. Va. 455, 465 (1879); Bmucs,
PLEADING & PRACTiCE 408; also articles cited in note 47 supra.
50 The statute is quoted in the text at page 146 supra.
51 The statute is paraphrased in the text at page 143 supra.
52 Contrast the compulsory nature of the counterclaim procedure before
justices of the peace. W. VA. CODE c. 50, art. 5, §§ 1-3 (Michie, 1949).
53 121 W. Va. 601, 5 S.E.2d 621 (1939).
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that he was entitled to credits for fees or commissions for services
in respect to collections which had not been allowed in computing
the amount for which a note was given and on which he was being
sued. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the evidence had
been erroneously admitted, stating that there "must be a special
plea" alleging partial failure of consideration before this defense
can be made. The court cited only the statute to support this con-
clusion. Professor Carlin has demonstrated that at common law
partial failure of consideration in a contract not under seal may be
proved under the general issue accompanied by a notice of recoup-
ment and that there is nothing in the statute which has the effect
of requiring the matter to be asserted by the special plea under
oath therein provided.5' Because of the extensive coverage of the
present statute, this case may mean that no matter proper for re-
coupment in an action on a contract can be asserted except by the
special plea.s5 However, the case could be distinguished if the court
were confronted by a case in which a notice of recoupment ac-
companies the general issue, for, not only was there no special plea
relating to this matter in the case, there seems to have been no
notice of any kind to the plaintiff of the counterclaim. In any
event, the case does not purport to deprive the defendant of his
option either to set up his claim by a special plea under the statute
or to maintain an independent action thereon against the plaintiff.
Although the recoupment statute permits the defendant to set
up matters in an action at law on a contract which would entitle
him to relief in equity against obligations thereunder,0 another
section of the Code expressly preserves the defendant's right to
assert such matters in equity rather than in the law action. s  Only
where the defendant tenders such matter in his plea and the rights
,4 Carlin, supra note 27, at 167.
55 Filing of the statutory plea would be necessary to entitle the defendant
to recover an excess against the plaintiff [W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 5, §9 (Michie,
1949)]; but commentators have expressed doubt that the statute was intended
to supersede common law recoupment, where it was available by notice under
the general issue to defeat the action or to reduce the damages. Bumuc,
PLEADING : PRACTICE 408; Carlin, supra note 27, at 170. However, Professor
Carlin states that the Greever case seems to indiclate that matters formerly
proper for recoupment by notice under the general issue must now be asserted
by a special plea under oath. Id. at 176.
r6 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 5, § 5 (Michie, 1949).
57 Id. at c. 56, art. 5, § 6. As to other equitable defenses which are per-
mitted at law, the defendant is there also given the option of asserting them in
the law action or resorting to equity for the relief to which he may be entitled.
Id. at c. 55, art. 4, § 13.
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asserted are litigated is he barred by the statute from relief in equity
on the matter alleged in the plea.58
There is nothing in these statutes which requires even counter-
claims growing out of the same transaction to be determined in one
action, regardless of the simplicity of the issues which would be
involved and even though the claims would involve common ques-
tions of law and fact.
C. Criticism of the West Virginia Rules
In reading the West Virginia decisions on counterclaims, one
is impressed by the antiquity of the authorities cited by the court
and the dry logic which is applied to these precedents in deciding
whether a multiplicity of actions may be avoided. No considera-
tion is given to trial convenience, except as application of the rules
may occasionally prevent a complexity of issues being submitted
to a jury.
In many cases the rules permit counterclaims to be asserted
irrespective of the confusion which may result. In an action on a
contract the defendant is permitted under the statute to set up any
matters growing out of the same transaction even though the plain-
tiff has brought an action for unliquidated damages,"0 and theo-
retically the jury is required to keep the issues sufficiently clear to
determine which party is entitled to recover and the amount of the
recovery. On the other hand, if it happens that the matter set up
by the defendant is determined not to have arisen from the same
transaction, the defendant is privileged to assert his claim only if
both the plaintiff's claim and his claim are liquidated.60 But here
the defendant is not limited in the number of claims which he may
assert if they are liquidated, and he may also assert in the same
action any unliquidated demands arising from the contract sued
on. Remember also that the plaintiff may have sued on any num-
ber of contracts in the same action. 01 In addition, under the tests
used to determine whether the claims are liquidated, there is no
58 One point of ambiguity exists in the West Virginia statute. The statute
provides that the defendant's right to assert in equity matters alleged in his
plea is saved if his plea is rejected "for not being offered in due time". Is the
defendant's right saved if the plea is rejected for some other reason? Burgs,
PLEADING & PRACT C E 411.
59 This statute is discussed in the text at page 146 supra.
60 See text at pages 143-144 supra.
61 See Lugar, supra note 44, at 174.
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assurance that much confusion may not be involved even as to
liquidated claims.62
Yet even with these possibilities, no counterclaim may be as-
serted in a tort action,63 irrespective of the simplicity of the issues
involved in the plaintiff's and defendant's claims or the common
questions of law and fact that may be involved in the claims. On
the other hand, many tort claims involving complex issues may be
combined by the plaintiff when he sues. 4
Despite this inconsistency in approach as to claims which may
be decided in one action and the lack of any justification therefor
based on rules of trial convenience, defendants may often be re-
quired to suffer hardships and the courts be burdened with addi-
tional unnecessary litigation as a result of the existing rules on
counterclaims. When the court is called upon to decide whether
compliance with existing rules has been obtained, the arguments
which will be persuasive will have no relation to trial convenience.
The decision will be based on rules perhaps designed generally to
avoid undue complexity in the issues for trial, but whether their
application in the particular case has that effect will not be
controlling.
D. Counterclaims in Other Jurisdictions
How have other states dealt with the problem? Many code
states have passed what may be called statutes of counterclaims. To
find a satisfactory formula has not been free of difficulties, and
various limitations on the assertion of claims by defendants have
been tried. The aim of these statutes has been to enable litigants
to settle in one action as many controversies as possible if incon-
venience at the trial stage will not outweigh the advantages of
settling the many claims in one action. These statutes have at-
tempted to solve the problem in the same way generally as the
West Virginia statutes do, but with greater liberality in permitting
counterclaims to be asserted. The limitations on allowing the
claims have been couched in terms which permit the court some
discretion in application of the rules, but they too are designed to
prevent inconvenience at the trial stage by imposing rules expected
to accomplish this purpose generally without consideration of the
facts or issues involved in the particular case before the court.
02 The nature of liquidated demands is discussed in the text at pages
144-145 supra. See especially notes 16 and 19 supra.
63 See text at pages 147-148 supra.
64 See Lugar, supra note 44, at 173.
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Most of these statutes provide that the counterclaim " 'must be
one existing in favor of a defendant against a plaintiff, between
whom a several judgment might be had in the action, and arising
out of one of the following causes of action:
" '1. Cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction
set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim,
or connected with the subject of the action.' ,,65
And many of the statutes add:
"'2. In an action arising upon contract, any other cause of
action arising also upon contract and existing at the commence-
ment of the action.'"66
Judge Clark refers to the first provision as the "transaction"
clause and to the second provision as the "contract" clause,67 and
for convenience the same terminology will be used herein.
E. "Transaction" Clause Comparison
Since counterclaim statutes permit the defendant to recover an
affirmative judgment against the plaintiff if his claim established
at the trial exceeds that of the plaintiff,08 the transaction clause
corresponds generally with the West Virginia statute allowing this
extension in recoupment.6 9 However, the class of claims which may
be asserted by the defendant is much more limited in West Virginia.
As to claims allowed in recoupment at common law, the West
Virginia court originally indicated that the defendant might re-
coup whenever the demands of both parties sprang out of the same
"contract or transaction".70 By application of the rule these quoted
words came to determine the scope of each other and not to mean,
65 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 642.
66 Ibid. In a footnote on the cited page Judge Clark lists the states which
have both provisions in their codes and those which have only the first provi-
sion, and citations to each code are included. Judge Clark also points out that
those states which do not have the second provision in their codes have set-off
provisions and that the decisions thereunder appear to be substantially the
same as those under the second provision.
67 Ibid.
68 Id. at 651.
69 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 5, § 9 (Michie, 1949).
70 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Jameson, 13 W. Va. 833, 838 (1878); Sterling
Organ Co. v. House, 25 W. Va. 64, 83 (1884). In the last case the court shaid:
"... Recently not only has the term recoupment been revived, but the doctrine
has sprung into new life. . . . it is now held that the defendant may recoup
generally, whenever the demands of both parties spring out of the same contract
or transaction; and it opens in this country generally the entire contract or
transaction, so far as is necessary to determine the plaintiff's right to damages
and the amount of the defendant's cross-claims." Ibid. See also Clark's Cove
Guano Co. v. Appling, 33 W. Va. 470, 472, 10 S.E. 809, 810 (1890).
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as in other jurisdictions, claims arising from the same contract or
arising from some other occurrence. 71 Judge Green, in Logie v.
Black72 in applying the rule to an action on a contract, stated:
"... . When the basis of the plaintiff's action is a contract,
and his complaint is that there has been a breach of such con-
tract by the defendant, then the defendant may if he chooses
recoup any damages, which may have resulted to him by a
breach of another portion of the same contract or of a contract
made at the same time and constituting a part and parcel of
the same transaction, whether contained all in one writing or
in two separate writings, or one in a writing and the other
parol, provided however they are all one transaction ... "73
Using this case and two other West Virginia cases as precedents,
a well known writer on West Virginia practice stated the rule as
follows:
"The right of the defendant to recoup must necessarily
arise out of contract, and this defense is only available when
the basis of the plaintiff's action is a contract, and his complaint
is that there has been a breach thereof by the defendant; in
which case the defendant may recoup any damages which may
have resulted to him by a breach of another portion of the
contract or of a contract made at the same time and constitut-
ing a part and parcel of the same transaction, whether con-
tained in one writing or in two separate writings, or one in
writing and the other in parol, provided, however, they are
all one transaction. 74
Thus, what was first stated by the court as a broadening of what
might be considered part of the same contract was limited by this
writer to mean that recoupment could only be used if the basis of
the plaintiffs action was a contract. Neither the Logie case nor the
other two cases7 5 cited in support of this proposition so held nor
was there anything said by the court in those cases to imply that
the rule was so limited. In fact the two additional cases are the
ones in which the court had indicated that recoupment might be
available if the claims arose from some other occurrence.78  The
only basis for the conclusion reached by this writer was a statement
71 ".... Any kind of claim at law could be used as recoupment against any
kind of claim so long as the scope-limiting requirement that they Urise out of
the same transaction was observed." Blume, The Scope of a Civil Action, 42
MicH. L. REv. 257, 267 (1943). See also CLARK, CODE PLEADING 635; 47 AM. JuR.,
Setoff and Counterclaim § 21.
72 24 W. Va. 1 (1884).
73 Id. at 19. Italics supplied.
74 HoGo, PLEADING & FORMS § 262 (1895). Italics supplied.
75 Clark's Cove Guano Co. v. Appling, 33 W. Va. 470, 10 S.E. 809 (1890);
Sterling Organ Co. v. House, 25 W. Va. 64 (1884).
70 See note 70 supra.
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by the court in the Logie case, 77 which however was only intended
by the court to apply to the facts of that case which did involve an
action on a contract.7 8
Nevertheless, in Bowling v. Walls,7 9 the court quoted the com-
mentator as set forth above with approval, although in that case
the principles enunciated therein were used for the purpose of
supporting the court's holding that the defendant might recoup
damages arising from breach of an agreement by the plaintiff even
though the agreement was contained in a separate writing executed
on the same date that the contract sued on was executed and grew
out of the same transaction. No other authority was cited for this
holding. Whether because of this approval or for some other
reason, only one West Virginia case has been found in which the
defendant sought to recoup damages when the plaintiff was not
suing on a contract, and in that case recoupment was not allowed. 0
Irrespective of the possibility at common law of recouping damages
when the plaintiff's claim does not arise from a contract,8' the de-
fendant can not recover by common law recoupment a judgment
against the plaintiff for any excess.8 2 For this reason the defendant
will generally prefer to use the statutory plea of recoupment,
set-off being inappropriate where damages are unliquidated, so
that he may recover any excess established at the trial. The
recoupment statute clearly applies only where the plaintiff sues
on a contract.8 3 No question can arise here concerning the possi-
bility of the defendant's using the matters available under the
statute in an action based on any other type of transaction.
77 "The defendant cannot recoup, unless his damages to be recouped arise
from some breach of contract by the plaintiff, which is in some way .. .directly
connected with the contract on which the action is based, and a part of the
same transaction out of which the contract sued on arose . 2. " 4 W. Va. at 20.
78 Note the italicized words in the quotation from the Logie case set forth
in the text above. The sentence quoted in the text immediately precedes the
statement quoted in note 77 supra.
79 72 W. Va. 638, 78 S.E. 791 (1913).
80 Fink v. United States Coal & Coke Co., 72 W. Va. 507, 78 S.E. 702 '(1913).
This case was decided approximately a month before the Walls case. It was an
action for the value of animals taken and sold by the defendant as having been
forfeited to the owner of lawfully enclosed premises by virtue of statutory pro-
ceedings. The defendant was denied the right to recoup the damages done to
its property by the trespassing animals. Said the court: "Recoupment is
peculiarly and only a contractual right and is limited to damages for breach of
the identical contract on which the plaintiff sues." Id. at 511, 78 S.E. at 704.
81 See note 71 supra.
82 See cases cited in note 3 supra.
83 "In any action on a contract, the defendant may file a plea .. " W. VA.
CODE c. 56, art. 5, § 5 (Michie, 1949). Italics supplied.
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The further question arises as to whether the defendant may
under the statute "recoup" and recover any excess of damages
arising from breach of a separate contract where it was a part of
the transaction in which the contract sued on was executed. In
the cases which arose prior to the revision of the statute in 1931 and
which where decided on common law principles of recoupment, the
court took the position that damages arising from such contracts
might be shown in reduction of the plaintiff's claim as they might
if they arose from breaches of other portions of the same contract. 84
The wording alone of the amended statute would indicate that no
question should arise on this issue since it now provides that the
defendant may set up any matter which would entitle him to re-
cover damages at law from the plaintiff.85 By using a plea under
the statute the defendant should be able to avoid the question,
which often arose on common law recoupment, as to whether the
claim which he asserts arose from breach of a contract different
from that on which the action was brought.86
84 In Bowling v. Walls, 72 W. Va. 638, 78 S.E. 791 (1913), the plaintiff
sold his store to the defendant and agreed to stay out of the mercantile business
for a period of four months. Part of the consideration for the sale was repre-
sented by notes; the agreement not to compete was contained in a separate
writing of the same date as the notes. In an action on one of the notes the
defendant was permitted to recoup damages from breach of the agreement not
to compete since they arose "out of the very transaction which affords a basis of
plaintiff's action." Id. at 639, 78 S.E. at 791. See also the quotation from the
Logie case in the text at page 155 supra.
85 ".. . the defendant may file a plea alleging . . . any other matter, as
would entitle him either to recover damages at law from the plaintiff ... or to
relief in equity .. . against the obligation of the contract ...... W. VA. CODE
c. 56, art. 5, § 5 (Michie, 1949). The complcte section is qfioted in the text at
page 146 supra.
86 Claims held not to arise from the same "contract":
(1) where the contract sued on placed the plaintiff under no obligation
to the defendant to procure claims for the defendant to prosecute, the plaintiff's
procuring the revocation of the defendant's authority to prosecute claims after
the defendant had spent labor and money in their prosecution, Logie v. Black,
24 W. Va. 1 (1884).
(2) where the defendant's demand for damages for the plaintiff's failure
to perform a contract grew out of the contract of agency between the parties
for one year and the plaintiff's demand rested on a note given under an agency
between the same parties for the preceding year, Clark's Cove Guano Co. v.
Appling, 33 W. Va. 470, 10 S.E. 809 (1890);
(3) where the defendant agreed by one contract to purchase cans and solder
from the plaintiff who by an independent contract agreed to buy canned goods
from the defendant, J. C. Orrick & Son Co. v. Dawson, 67 W. Va. 403, 68 S.E. 39
(1910);
(4) where the plaintiff sued on two notes given in settlement for a pumping
outfit for defendant's house, the defendant's claim for damages for breach of
an independent contract for new parts, Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Breckinridge,
84 W. Va. 233, 99 S.E. 398 (1919); accord, American Sugar Refining Co. v.
DMartin-Nelly Grocery Co., 90 W. Va. 730, Ill S.E. 759 (1922);
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However, the West Virginia court may reach the conclusion
that the words "or any other matter", inserted by the revisers to
make the statute read as did the Virginia statute,7 apply only to
"other matters" which grow out of the contract on which the de-
fendant is sued. In construing this statute the Virginia court
reached this conclusion, s8 and applied the rule to prevent the
defendant from "recouping" damages arising from breach of the
contract from which the transaction involved in the action had
resulted.8 9  One may only hope that the West Virginia court will
be more influenced by the revisers' note than by the construction
and application of the statute by the Virginia court. The revisers
stated that the added words are intended to give the defendant a
(5) where the damages claimed by the defendant resulted from the in-
ferior quality of feed furnished to him by the plaintiff prior to the time the
orders were given on which the action was based, Allen v. Simmons, 90 W. Va.
774, 111 S.E. 838 (1922).
Claims held to arise from the same "contract":
(1) where the plaintiff sued for the price of certain organs furnished the
defendant under a contract which provided that the plaintiff would furnish
organs as requested until reasonable notice to the contrary was given, claim for
damages for failure of the plaintiff to furnish certain organs without having
given the defendant reasonable notice, Sterling Organ Co. v. House, 25 W. Va.
64 (1884);
(2) where the plaintiff sued on one of the notes representing part of the
consideration for the sale of a mercantile business, a claim for damages from
breach of plaintiffs agreement to stay out of the mercantile business for a
period of four months, even though the plaintiffs agreement was contained in
a separate writing, Bowling v. Walls, 72 W. Va. 638, 78 S.E. 791 (1913);
(3) where the plaintiff sued on promissory notes of the defendants, a claim
for damages arising from breach of plaintiff's agreement to continue a sales
arrangement from which sums due the defendants would be applied in
payment of the notes, Cook Pottery Co. v. Parker, 86 W. Va. 580, 104 S.E. 51
(1920); accord, Hooper-Mankin Fuel Co. v. Shrewsbury Coal Co., 94 W. Va.
442, 119 S.E. 176 (1923);
(4) where the plaintiff sued on certain notes given for radio supplies sold
to the defendant under a contract which provided that the plaintiff would
appoint no other dealers for Atwater-Kent supplies in a certain area without
talking it over with the defendant, a claim for damages resulting from the
plaintiff's appointing another dealer without discussing the matter with the
defendant, Williams Hardware Co. v. Phillips, 109 W. Va. 109, 153 S.E. 147
(1930).
87 VA. CoDE § 6145 (Michie, 1930). For the West Virginia statute, see
note 85 supra.
88 American Manganese Co. v. Virginia Manganese Co., 91 Va. 272, 21 S.E.
466 (1895).
89 In this case the plaintiff had sold certain personal property to the
defendant after the expiration of a lease ttnd in accordance with the terms of
the lease between the parties. An action was brought to recover the agreed
price, and the defendant sought to plead damages sustained by it as lessor
through violation by the plaintiff of other provisions in the lease. See defend-
ant's plea. Id. at 277, not reprinted in Southeastern Reporter. A demurrer
to the plea was sustained since the court viewed the agreements in the declara-
tion and plea as "separate and distinct". Id. at 280, 21 S.E. at 466.
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right to recover an excess over, to which he is entitled, in any
instance where he recoups damages under the provision of the
article. ° If the court should adopt the view of the Virginia court,
the defendant will need to determine whether his damages arose
from a "different contract" and the cases in which this question
arose on common law recoupment should be persuasive.Y1 In any
event, since the revisers viewed the statute as an aid in recoupment,
the court ought to permit the defendant to treat the contract sued
on as including "another portion of the contract or of a contract
made at the same time and constituting a part and parcel of the
same transaction."9 2 The West Virginia court has indicated that
such counterclaims will be allowed.93 The Virginia court has been
influenced in its construction of the statute by the words "against
the obligation of the contract."94  These words could be held to
apply only to equitable defenses permitted to defeat the plaintiff's
recovery, and the words "any other matter which would entitle him
to recover damages at law from the plaintiff" be held to permit
the defendant to plead any cause of action, whether arising out of
the contract sued on or not, which entitles him to recover damages
from the plaintiff. However, in view of its historical background as
a statute of recoupment and its having been patterned on the
Virginia statute, this interpretation does not appear likely. This
is especially true since such interpretation would render the set-off
statute unnecessary if the word "contract" in the recoupment statute
were held to include implied contracts.
In any event, the addition of these words to the statute should
remove the inequities present in that series of cases which formerly
held that an unliquidated claim, though arising out of the same
transaction, could not be the subject of set-off with a right to re,
90 Revisers' note to W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 5, § 5 (Michie, 1949).
91 These cases are collected in note 86 supra.
92 Contrast the treatment accorded the defendant by the West Virginia
court under the principles of common law recoupment with that accorded the
defendant by the Virginia court under the statute. See notes 84 and 89 supra,
93 In Charleston Milling & Produce Co. v. Craighead, 116 W. Va. 194, 179
S.E. 69 (1935), the plaintiff sued on a note signed by the defendants. At the
time of signing the note, and to secure the payment thereof, the defendants
conveyed certain property to a trustee. Before instituting this action the
plaintiff purchased this property at a void sale under the trust deed. The
defendant filed a "counterclaim" for the value of the goods thus converted
by the plaintiff. Said the court: ". . . The trust deed and note being parts of
the same transaction, the counterclaim is also authorized under the statute of
recoupment, Code 1931, 56-5-5 .. " Id. at 195, 179 S.E. at 69. The claim was
held also proper under the set-off statute.
94 See Cox v. Hagan, 125 Va. 656, 677, 100 S.E. 666, 673 (1919).
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cover any excess. 95  In this situation the most that the defendant
could do was to recoup his damages with no possibility of a recovery
for any excess. An outstanding example of this treatment was in-
volved in Hooper-Mankin Fuel Co. v. Shrewsbuiy Coal Co.' The
plaintiff sued on a note which originated out of a contract under
which the plaintiff advanced the defendant money and agreed to
purchase coal from the defendant, the payments for the coal to be
credited on the note. The defendant filed a plea of set-off for
damages from the plaintiff's refusal to take the coal, and refused
to allow the plea to be treated by the court as a notice of recoup-
ment to the extent of the plaintiff's demands. The lower court
struck out all of the defendant's evidence relating to the contract
and directed a verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment even though it recognized that the
defendant proposed to offset its unliquidated demand arising out
of the same transaction.' A plea under the present statute involv-
ing such claims should permit the defendant to recover any excessYs
The transaction clause used in other states permits counter-
claims where the cause of action asserted arose out of (1) the con-
tract, or (2) the transaction set forth in the complaint as the founda-
tion of the plaintiff's claim, or (3) those connected with the subject
of the action. 99 The West Virginia court limits common law re-
coupment to the first of these classes, with an extension approaching
the second class,1°0 but refuses to allow counterclaims which might
be permitted under groups two or three.10 1 The West Virginia ex-
tension in class one was also recognized in these other states as
possible under class one.10 2 The more flexible limitations in classes
95 The earlier cases are collected and cited in the Shrewsbury Coal Co. case,
note 96 infra.
96 94 W. Va. 442, 119 S.E. 176 (1923).
97 Id. at 445, 119 S.E. at 177.
98 See note 93 supra. If the counterclaim is authorized under W. VA. CODE
c. 56, art. 5, § 5 (Michie, 1949), then section nine of the same chapter and
article authorizes recovery of any excess over the plaintiff's demand.
99 CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 102. See also text at page 154 supra.
100 See the West Virginia case discussed in note 84 supra.
101 For scope of classes two and three, see text which follows.
102 "'Contract' is ... used to refer to the course of negotiations culminating
in the agreement sued upon." CLARK, CODE PLEADING 655. In a note to this
statement Judge Clark collects cases to illustrate its meaning. One of these
involved an action for rent in which the defendant was permitted to counter-
claim for the conversion of his oats, grown by permission on other land of the
plaintiff to feed teams for harvesting crops on the leased premises-a claim
growing out of the negotiations leading up to the lease sued on. Brunson v.
Teague, 123 Ark. 594, 186 S.W. 78 (1916). Compare the West Virginia case
decided under the revised recoupment statute. See note 93 supra. Contrast
the Virginia case discussed in note 89 supra.
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two and three have never concerned the West Virginia court in
deciding whether the defendant might recoup his claim, and as pre-
viously indicated, there seems to be little likelihood of any greater
privilege being given to the defendant under the revised recoup-
ment statute. In view of these facts and since the writer believes
the approach used in these statutes is not advisable, as will appear
more fully herein, little space will be given to a discussion of the
possibilities under classes two and three. It will suffice to state
generally what might be done under them to show how much
further the defendant in these jurisdictions may be allowed to
counterclaim.
Glass two might include "all those facts which a layman would
naturally associate with, or consider as being a part of, the affair,
altercation, or course of dealings between the parties"; 10 3 and class
three might allow "any cause of action which, although not a part
of the plaintiffs transaction, would, upon trial, raise issues which
are so like those raised by the complaint that justice and expediency
require that they should be tried together".104 As might be expected
the courts have not drawn clear lines of distinction between causes
of action arising out of the "transaction" and those connected with
the "subject of the action", but within those terms the defendant
is permitted to use counterclaims of the following nature: 0 5 in an
action on a promissory note for the purchase price of the plaintiff's
business, a counterclaim for false representations and publications
that the plaintiff had not sold his business but had merely arranged
for the defendant to run it until he returned; 00 in an action for
supplies furnished and labor performed at the request of the de-
fendant, a counterclaim for breach of warranty in the sale of the
automobile on which the repairs were made;'0 7 in an action for
103 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 655.
104 Ibid.
105 Four examples only are set forth in the text which follows. They were
selected in such way that the range of possibilities under the "transaction"
clause might be noted and that the liberality permitted might be contrasted
with the West Virginia rules previously discussed. The cases here used as well
as many more which illustrate these points are set forth in the notes to CLARK,
CODE PLEADING § 102, although not in as great detail as in the text which fol-
lows. See also examples of claims held to arise out of the transaction or oc-
currence that is the subject matter of the suit. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 35
(2d ed. 1948). Contrast especially the court's statement in Fairbanks, Morse &
Co. v. Breckinridge, 84 W. Va. 233, 235, 99 S.E. 398, 399 (1919), that it is "not
sufficient the damage claimed may have some relation to the subject matter of
the original contract."
100 Driver v. Gillette, 43 S.D. 62, 177 N.W. 815 (1920).
107 Studebaker Corp. of America v. Hanson, 24 Wyo. 222, 160 Pac. 336
(1916).
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assault and battery, a counterclaim for damages resulting from an
assault committed on the defendant by the plaintiff in the course of
the encounter;-0 and in an action in replevin for the possession of
certain personalty, a counterclaim for legal services rendered in
connection with the manufacture of the chattels replevied.10 9
F. "Contract" Clause Comparison.1o
The contract clause corresponds generally with the West Vir-
ginia set-off statute, since the contract in the counterclaim need not
arise out of the same transaction as the contract on which the action
is based;"" although here again greater liberality is permitted than
in West Virginia. There is no requirement that either the plain-
tiff's or the defendant's claim be liquidated which is required of
both under the West Virginia statute."12 However, in the contract
clause, as in the transaction clause, these statutes attempt to prevent
great inconvenience from arising at the trial by limiting generally,
but not on the facts of the particular case, what may be tried by a
jury in one action. In the transaction clause greater liberality is per-
mitted as to asserting unliquidated claims, for the added burden at
trial is offset by the benefits of trying in one action the different
claims arising from one set of facts. Under the contract clause the
facts involved on each claim may have nothing in common since
the demands may arise out of different transactions. Because of the
possible trial burdens the courts therefore place rather restrictive
interpretations on the contract clause with the result that the de-
fendant can not assert many more counterclaims under it than he
can under the West Virginia set-off statute.
This type of statute for West Virginia has been urged,"1 3 but
it would meet the problem only in a limited fashion. The contract
clause has not been applied as often as the transaction clause, and
108 Gutzman v. Clancy, 114 Wis. 589, 90 N.W. 1081 (1902).
109 Elevator Automatic Signal Co. v. Bok, 159 N.Y. Supp. 13 (1st Dep't
1916).
11o The statutes here to be discussed have already been described and the
source of the terminology being used has been noted. See notes 66 and 67
supra and the accompanying text.
111 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 661. See also text at page 154 supra. As noted
above in the text, the contract provision in the transaction clause limits counter-
claims to those arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the plain-
tiff's pleading. This distinction between recoupment and set-off in West Vir-
ginia has been developed earlier in the text.
112 See note 11 supra. Compare Thayer-Moore Brokerage Co. v. Campbell,
164 Mo. App. 8, 147 S.W. 545 (1912), cited in CLARuK, CODE PLEADING 661.
113 Ritz, supra note 1, at 277. See also Note, 28 W. VA. L.Q. 139 (1922).
21
Lugar: Common Law Pleading Modified Versus The Federal Rules: III. Count
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1951
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the decisions have usually involved the question of whether the
counterclaim arose "upon contract" rather than whether the plain-
tiff's action arose "upon contract". Many of these cases support the
conclusion that any cause of action which might afford a basis for
a claim in express or implied contract may be offered as a counter-
claim under the contract clause. 114 It would seem that a similar
conclusion ought to be deducible concerning the plaintiff's cause
of action in order that the counterclaim be permitted."'5 However,
many cases do not support the conclusions stated, adopting more re-
strictive rules, and the scope of the contract clause is left doubtful." 6
G. The Federal Rule
This fear of trial burdens, illustrated in the restrictive interpre-
tations placed on the contract clause, has caused courts and drafters
of statutes to limit greatly the scope of permissive counterclaims.
Some of the harsh results thereof have been noted herein and others
will be discussed. The approach in the Federal Rules and statutes
or rules based on those rules seems much more sensible. The
matter of trial convenience is given due consideration as a problem
at the trial stage, but not as a pleading matter. This permits treat-
ment of each case on its facts and avoids the possibility of incon-
venience at the trial under general pleading rules designed to pre-
vent such burdens. It also permits the pleading rules to be designed
to prevent harsh results and to settle expeditiously the cross-claims
between the parties to the litigation."17
Federal Rule 42 (b) provides that the court in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any
counterclaim or of any number of counterclaims."" With this dis-
cretion in the trial court to order separate trials to prevent undue
delay or otherwise promote the interests of justice, Federal Rule 13
allows great liberality in asserting counterclaims. 1 9 It also provides
for compulsory assertion of counterclaims which are closely related
114 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 663. Note that this would include contract
actions for unliquidated damages.
115 Note that the same approach is used in determining whether a claim
may be used as a set-off under the West Virginia statute, namely, both the
plaintiff's claim and the defendant's demand must be of the same nature. See
text at page 144 supra.
116 CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 103.
117 Judge Clark has referred to the federal rules which authorize a wide
scope in the counterclaim procedure as "among the more useful provisions of the
new practice." CLARK, CODE PLEADING 645.
11s Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
119 Ibid.
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to the claim that is the subject matter of the action. Any counter-
claim which arises out of "the transaction or occurrence" that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, with certain
limited exceptions, must be asserted. Any counterclaim not arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim may be asserted. This wording of the
rule requires or permits the plaintiff to take the same action on
counterclaims asserted by the defendant which involve independent
demands.1 20
H. Proposed Rule for West Virginia
The writer is hesitant to advocate the adoption of compulsory
counterclaims, even to the extent required by the federal rule,121 in
West Virginia procedure at this time. The federal rule is designed
to obtain a complete settlement of all claims arising out of the same
set of facts. The objective is desirable and has been supported in
this paper in urging that goal for permissive joinder of causes of
action.122 It is recommended here as far as permissive assertion of
counterclaims is concerned. However, it seems preferable that the
bench and bar first have some experience with severance of issues
for trial before requiring that there be asserted in the action all
claims the defendant may have arising from the transaction or
occurrence on which the plaintiff's claim is based. 123 This is especial-
ly true if legal and equitable claims must be asserted in the same
120 Doubt arises as to whether the plaintiff should be permitted to assert
in his reply a counterclaim not arising out of the transaction or occurrence
which is the subject matter of the defendant's claim. CLARK, CODE PLEADING
649; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTrICE 22. Both writers suggest that the proper pro-
cedure would be to require the plaintiff to amend his complaint to add the
claim based on the independent transaction. The liberality of the federal rules
on amendments and joinder of claims has been previously discussed in this
paper. Similar problems can arise under the first sentence of W. VA. CODE c. 56,
art. 5, § 9 (Michie, 1949).
121 Some persons believe that all counterclaims of every nature should be
compulsory, that is, every claim a party has against his opponent should be
pleaded regardless of choice. For a criticism of this suggestion, see 3 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTica 27.
122 Lugar, supra note 44, at 199, 204.
123 Note that the federal rule would also require the plaintiff to assert any
counterclaims which urose out of matters set forth by the defendant. Even the
experience which may have been acquired by the West Virginia bar under the
mandatory provisions of the counterclaim procedure before justices of the peace,
applicable to both plaintiffs and defendants, would not seem to be very helpful.
The claims there involved are small and the scope of required counterclaims
is narrower than that under the federal rule. In addition, no procedure in-
volving separation of issues for trial is involved. W. VA. CODE c. 50, art. 5
(Michie, 1949).
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action.'24 In addition, the concept of "transaction or occurrence"
being flexible, 125 the pleader would assert every possibly related
claim to protect himself from being barred from the later assertion
of any claim by the doctrine of res adjudicata.126 It is feared there-
fore that too many complications would result if the compulsory
counterclaim procedure were adopted initially. The writer con-
cedes that under the permissive counterclaim procedure recom-
mended herein counsel may produce the same complications; but
where prejudice or delay in the trial of his claims is likely to result,
they may be saved for independent litigation. If counsel seeks to
cause complications, a free use of severance of issues for trial will
protect the opposing party from prejudice or delay.
The proposal here made is that the pleader be permitted to
assert as counterclaims any claims which he has against the opposing
party with the right to recover a judgment against him for any
excess established at the trial and to any other relief to which he
would be entitled if the claims were asserted in independent
actions.327 This would include under a merger of procedure at law
and in equity the assertion of a legal claim in an "equity" proceed-
ing or an equitable claim in a proceeding "at law".12s Statutes
124 This subject is discussed in the next part of this paper.
125 ". . 'Transaction' is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend
a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of
their connection as upon their logical relationship .... Moore v. New York
Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926). See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcricE
§ 13.13, for a comprehensive discussion of the scope of the concept, recognizing
that the scope has been broadened by use of "transaction or occurrence" in
lieu of "transaction" as found in some rules. Note also the kind of counter.
claims permitted under the transaction clause in other jurisdictions. See text
at page 161 supra.
126 That the principle of res adjudicata will apply under the federal rule to
counterclaims which are omitted when they should have been pleaded, see
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 648; 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcT cE 28.
127 This would permit all claims between the parties to be pleaded as
counterclaims. The distinction between set-off and recoupment would become
immaterial. A tort claim might be asserted in a contract action, or vice versa.
It would not be important whether the counterclaim arose from the subject
matter involved in the opposing party's claim, independent claims being equally
permissible. The counterclaim need not be one which would reduce or defeat
the opposing party's recovery; the demand might exceed the amount sought by
the other or might be for a different kind of relief, the latter possibility being
especially important if legal and equitable procedure are merged. See 3 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 13.02, on the scope of Federal Rule 13.
There may be some who would prefer to limit this broadened right to
counterclaim to certain types of actions or proceedings. Some code states follow
this procedure. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 649.
128 This is permitted under Federal Rule 13. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
10. The subject of combining legal and equitable procedure will be discussed
in the next part of this paper. The manner of handling the right to jury trial
is treated there.
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similar to this had been passed prior to the adoption of the Federal
Rules. 129 A rule of this nature would remove all restrictions on the
right to plead counterclaims, but the purpose of the existing techni-
cal restrictive rules would be fulfilled by a discretion in the trial
court to sever the claims for trial if the combination was in fact so
complex that it would be difficult for the jury, if a jury were re-
quired, to "keep the accounts straight." 1 0 The court should have
the power even during the original trial to sever claims and order
separate trials of them if the complexity of the issues involved was
not evident prior to the introduction of the evidence.
The suggestion here made would give the defendant the same
freedom of asserting independent claims against the plaintiff as has
been proposed herein for the plaintiff against the defendant by
liberalizing the rules on permissive joinder of claims or causes of
action.1 31 In like manner, the defendant's omission to assert a
counterclaim would not prevent his using the claim as the basis
of an independent action,132 unless he asserted part of the claim as
a counterclaim and a later action thereon would involve a splitting
of the cause of action."33 On the other hand, the defendant would be
limited in the assertion of two or more independent claims by the
rules on joinder of claims, which have been discussed. 134
129 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 643-644 and notes thereto. Compare the English
practice which permits the defendant to set up any counterclaim whatsoever
against the plaintiff and to bring into court additional parties necessary for its
complete determination, the court having discretion however to exclude the
counterclaim on application of any party to it. For example, it might be more
conveniently tried in a separate action. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 12 n. 4.
Compare the text which follows.
130 This power of severance exists under the Federal Rules. See note 118
supra.
131 Lugar, supra note 44, at 204.
32 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTiCE 48 n. 2. This right the defendant now has
in West Virginia with reference to recoupment and set-off. See text at page
150 supra. It need not be affected by a liberalization of the rules as to permis-
sible counterclaims. Compare also the statute which expressly preserves the
defendant's right to proceed in equity even where he has been authorized to
use as legal defenses other matters formerly available only in equity for relief.
W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 4, § 13 (Michie, 1949).
133 See authorities cited in note 49 supra.
134 The limitations on the joinder of claims under the Federal Rules have
been discussed in a preceding part of this paper. Lugar, supra note 44, at 199,
204. See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 50-51. The example given by Professor
Moore will serve to summarize the possibilities: "Suppose that A, B, and C,
joint obligees under a contract, sue X, Y, and Z, joint obligors. Any ... claims
that they [X, Y, and Z] have jointly against A, B, and C may be counterclaimed.
But could Z also plead a claim, say for libel, against only C that had no relation
to the other claims? It would seem that he could not, for inasmuch as his libel
claim presents no question of law or fact common to the other claims, its
joinder would have been improper had X, Y, and Z proceeded as plaintiffs.
That claim could, however, be severed and proceeded with separately." Id.
at 51 n. 15.
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The suggested change would permit the defendant to file a
counterclaim in cases like Fink v. United States Coal & Coke Co.
1 35
and Knight v. Brown. 30 In the Fink case the plaintiff sued for the
value of fifteen hogs taken by the defendant. The defendant
claimed that a statute authorized the seizure in view of previous
trespasses by the hogs. In this action the defendant also attempted
to recoup or set-off a claim for damage done by the hogs. Neither
remedy was broad enough to permit the defendant to obtain this
relief in the action, even though the same facts, except for the
amount of the damage done, were relevant to the defendant's de-
fense. It is difficult to see how the additional issue of the amount
of damage done could have introduced any great confusion into
the trial. Clearly the confusion would not have been as great as it
might be in those cases where the plaintiff is suing for unliquidated
damages from the breach of a contract and the defendant sets up
counterclaims for unliquidated damages from breaches of other
provisions of that contract. The latter would be allowed in West
Virginia. 3 7
In the Knight case the plaintiff sued for damages resulting
from the diversion of a stream of water by the defendant so that it
flowed on the plaintiff's land. The defendant attempted to set up
as a bar to the action a plea that the plaintiff had caused the stream
to flow on the defendant's land by denuding the banks of the stream
along that portion of it which passed through his land before it
reached the land of the defendant. The court held that acts of
wilful trespass could not be "set-off" against each other; but that
so far as the act of the plaintiff may have aggravated his own injury,
it might be shown in diminution of the damage claimed by him.
Since the defendant would want to prove these facts in mitigation
of damages from his act, it would require little other evidence to
show the amount of damage which the act of the plaintiff had
caused to his land. No confusion was likely to result if he had been
permitted to establish his damages under a counterclaim.
Matters of this nature could be allowed without even the
necessity of a separate trial. Our court has recognized that the
prevailing rules prevent counterclaims being filed although no
difficulty would be encountered at the trial stage. In Levine Bros.
13r, 72 W. Va. 507, 78 S.E. 702 (1913).
130 25 W. Va. 808 (1885).
137 See text at page 146 supra.
26
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [1951], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol53/iss2/4
COMMON LAW PLEADING
v. Mantell,138 the plaintiff sued for recovery of the price of goods
sold during an eight-month period, and the defendant asserted by
way of set-off a claim of damages for nondelivery of a part of one
order. Since the plaintiff made no objection to this set-off, which
was improper being an unliquidated claim, the court held that the
lower court had jurisdiction to try the "two cases" together and
that the plaintiff was bound by the judgment. The court said:
"... . The question relates to the rights of the parties.
and that right pertains to matters of form rather than sub-
stance. .-. . If a separate action had been instituted by the
defendant and both actions matured and made ready for hear-
ing, we have no doubt that the trial court, in its discretion and
with their consent, could have ordered them to be heard to-
gether and tried by one jury .... ,13 9
Additional recognition that existing rules on counterclaims are
unduly restrictive may be found in the procedural rule respecting
cross-actions in tort, promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals
in 1940.140 This rule provides for compulsory consolidation where
two actions based on the same occurrence are pending and the
parties plaintiff and defendant therein have charged each other
with liability for negligence. This rule was designed to lessen the
likelihood that the doctrine of res adjudicata might be used un-
fairly, and it will continue to be necessary for that purpose.1 41 How-
ever, the issues involved in one trial under this procedure may pro-
duce greater confusion than would be present in the assertion of
many counterclaims not permitted in West Virginia. The trial
confusion resulting under the suggested rule would be less than that
possible under the existing procedure for consolidating these cross-
actions in tort, for where complexity in the issues for trial might
result, the court could order separate trials of counterclaims to the
extent necessary to avoid confusion.
The adoption of the rule here urged, although permissive,
would encourage the determination of all claims between the parties
in one action. The existing rules are so restrictive and in many
respects so doubtful in application that counsel is either definitely
precluded from asserting some counterclaims or is so uncertain as
to their permissibility that the easier course is to start independent
actions. Since the proposed rule would preserve the objective of
138 90 W. Va. 166, 111 S.E. 501 (1922).
139 Id. at 172, 111 S.E. at 503.
140 125 W. Va. on the sixth page (not numbered) in the report.
141 Carlin, A Decade of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, 53 W. VA. L. Rxv.
1, 23 (1950).
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existing restrictions, while removing the hardships possible under
existing rules, no reason for not adopting the rule appears. In
addition, its acceptance would be another step toward the general
goal urged in this paper, namely, the avoidance of numerous actions
where the claims between the parties may be settled in one action
without prejudicing their rights.142
142 It has long been recognized that this was the goal of the set-off statute.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Jameson, 13 W. Va. 833, 837 (1878). Procedural
developments since that date have shown that the objective there sought may
be broadened to include many additional claims in one action and with greater
assurance that the rights of the parties will not thereby be prejudiced.
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